FDI IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRY'S MARKET CONCENTRATION AND PROFITABILITY by Orazalin, R. & Dulambaeva, R.T.
НОВИНИ СВІТОВОЇ НАУКИ428
Rustem Orazalin1, Raushan Dulambaeva2
FDI IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRY'S MARKET
CONCENTRATION AND PROFITABILITY
This research attempts to examine the effect of foreign direct investment and profitability
(pricecost margins) on market concentration in 26 CEE and CIS countries. The hypothesis
whether FDI and profitability make market concentration increase or decrease is tested using
instrumental variables (IV) methods (business environment indicators are treated as instruments)
in order to ensure that the possible endogeneity problem between FDI and concentration is elimi
nated. The results suggest that both FDI and market profitability are negatively correlated with the
market concentration, which is in line with the results of recent research by Amess and Roberts
(2004), Konings (2001), Siotis (2003), Rutkowski (2006).
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Рустем Оразалін, Раушан Дуламбаєва 
ВПЛИВ ПРЯМИХ ІНОЗЕМНИХ ІНВЕСТИЦІЙ НА
КОНЦЕНТРАЦІЮ ТА ПРИБУТКОВІСТЬ
РИНКУ КРАЇНИ+РЕЦИПІЄНТА   
У статті зроблено спробу дослідити вплив прямих іноземних інвестицій і
прибутковості (межі вартостіціни) на ринкову концентрацію в 26 країнах ЦСЄ і СНД.
Гіпотеза відносно того, підвищують або знижують ПІІ і прибутковість ринкову
концентрацію, перевірено за допомогою методу інструментальних змінних (показники
бізнессередовища взяті як інструменти) для усунення можливості проблеми
ендогенності між ПІІ і концентрацією. Результати показали, що ПІІ і прибутковість
ринку негативно корелюють з ринковою концентрацією, що відповідає результатам
останніх досліджень Амесса і Робертса (2004), Кенінгса (2001), Сиотіса (2003),
Рутковського (2006).   
Ключові слова: прямі іноземні інвестиції; ринкова концентрація; прибутковість;
інструментальні змінні.
Рустем Оразалин, Раушан Дуламбаева
ВЛИЯНИЕ ПРЯМЫХ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ИНВЕСТИЦИЙ НА
КОНЦЕНТРАЦИЮ И ПРИБЫЛЬНОСТЬ РЫНКА СТРАНЫ+
РЕЦИПИЕНТА 
В статье сделана попытка исследовать влияние прямых иностранных инвестиций и
прибыльности (границы стоимостицены) на рыночную концентрацию в 26 странах ЦВЕ и
СНГ. Гипотеза относительно того, повышают или понижают ПИИ и прибыльность
рыночную концентрацию, проверена с помощью метода инструментальных переменных
(показатели бизнессреды взяты в качестве инструментов) для устранения возможной
проблемы эндогенности между ПИИ и концентрацией. Результаты показали, что ПИИ и
прибыльность рынка негативно коррелируют с рыночной концентрацией, что
соответствует результатам последних исследований Амесса и Робертса (2004), Кенингса
(2001), Сиотиса (2003), Рутковского (2006). 
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1. Introduction. It is natural to expect foreign firms to crowd out domestic firms
at a market. This may be in the form of dumping because foreign entrant has relatively
small marginal cost of production. As a result market concentration can increase.
However, it was argued by many researchers that FDI could be the reason for positive
spillover for domestic firms, therefore productivity, efficiency and competitiveness of
local enterprises are likely to increase, which in turn can lead to less concentrated
markets. 
This study aims at understanding the impact of FDI and profitability on market
concentration of a hosting industry in transition countries. Thus the sample of 26
Central and Eastern European and CIS transition countries will be the subject for the
observations. The study will seek the answer to the question whether FDI and price
cost margins in transition economies increase market concentration leading to high
er concentration (hypothesis 1) OR whether FDI and profitability in transition
economies contributes to lower concentration (hypothesis 2). 
In terms of empirically assessing the FDI and concentration relationship two
way causality may arise, which leads to the endogeneity problem because not only
foreign entrant can affect incumbent's decision but also the degree of competition
between incumbents potentially may impact entry decision of investor. Moreover,
most authors faced endogeneity problem and to deal with it they applied GMM
IV and TSLS methods (Jordaan, 2005; Amess and Roberts, 2004; Konings, 2001;
Siotis, 2003). Potential endogeneity in this study which may arise because of cir
cular causality (as FDI can be attracted where concentration and profitability is
high) will be controlled by employing business environment as an instrument
which is correlated with FDI, but must not be explained by concentration or prof
itability. 
As crosssection data can give a broader image of FDI impact on market con
centration and profitability, this study, in contrast to many previous researchers' indi
vidualcountry approach, will employ a multiple regression analysis with crosssec
tional data. The database will be the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS) Questionnaire3 complied by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and World Bank.  Due to the survival nature of the
data qualitative response model will be the main framework for modeling the FDI and
concentration relationship.
In this context, our research aims to distinguish the positive or negative effect of
FDI and profitability on market concentration within the framework of the given
research work. In particular, this research project is designed to examine the compe
tition and pricecost margins effect of foreign direct investment. Main focus will be
on empirical methodology of testing whether FDI, profitability affect concentration
and through exogenous variables. In order to put the plan into operation, instrumen
tal variables estimator and twostage least squares methods are going to be used to test
the concentration and FDI, profitability relationship. 
3 I am grateful for the guidance, constructive support of Professor Mike Waterson.
The article is structured as follows. Literature review in Section II is followed by
the empirical model specification in section III. Then data description is described in
Section IV. The next section reports the empirical findings. Section VI concludes the
interpretation of the results and suggests further research directions.  
2. Literature review. The implications of FDI for a host country's industry may
be different in the cases of developed and developing countries. Starting with devel
oped economies' example, Barrios et al. (2004) showed that although FDI in Ireland
initially deterred the entry of local firms, afterwards positive externalities outweighed
and overall impact of FDI became positive for domestic entry. The authors used a
model with "semiparametric regression techniques on plant level panel data for
manufacturing sector of Ireland" (Barrios et al, 2004). Another example of FDI stud
ies in a developed economy was presented by Driffield. Considering inward invest
ments into the UK, Driffield (2001) also yields positive results of FDI impact on con
centration changes. His conclusions suggest that inward investment reduces concen
tration and increases competitive pressure at the industry level. 
Moving on to transition economies, Jordaan (2005) found no support for posi
tive externalities from FDI in Mexico which is in line with recent researchers.
Jordaan tested whether foreignowned firms create externalities in Mexican manu
facturing. In contrast to previous researchers he yielded negative externalities as a
result of FDI after carefully examining the determinants of inward foreign invest
ment.
Large number of studies has been done on the effect of FDI on competition,
concentration, externalities, productivity and technological spillovers (Maioli et.al.,
2006). However, despite the increasing importance of FDI rather than trade, litera
ture on FDI and pricecost margins seems to be lacking and needs to be studied,
although the importance of FDI outweighs the trade. According to the UNCTAD
World Investment Report 2005 (cited in Maioli et al., 2006) aggregate production of
MNCs in host countries prevails over aggregate exports. 
Other examples of FDI effect on a developing country's economy were present
ed by Amess and Roberts (2004), Ghemawat and Kennedy (1999), Konings (2001),
Siotis (2003). In general the researchers yielded a negative competition effect.
Extending Ghemawat and Kennedy's4 (1999) work, Amess and Roberts (2004) exam
ine the determinants of level and changes in concentration of Polish manufacturing
industries during early years of transition. Employing GMMIV method the authors
conclude that FDI "leads to increased competition for domestic firms because invest
ing firms own high technology and proprietary assets". Konings (2001) using firm
level panel data, investigates the implications of the FDI for the productivity per
formance of domestic firms in 3 emerging economies of CEEC. To deal with endo
geneity of ownership and spillovers he applies fixedeffect model with instrumental
variables. Konings (2001) yielded a negative competition effect that dominates a pos
itive technology effect. Also there appears to be no support for the positive spillover
effect to domestic firms. Siotis (2003) applying TSLS and GMM estimated sectoral
markups in Spanish economy for the period 19831996 and found a huge drop in
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4 
Ghemawat and Kennedy (1999) looked at the implications of the competitive shocks for entry, concentration and for
eign presence in manufacturing sector of Poland during early years of restructuring.
margins in industries which were the most exposed to international competition.
These results seem to suggest that in developing economies FDI has potential nega
tive implications for the industry concentration, competition and profitability of host
country's market. 
3. Econometric Methodology. In order to empirically specify the model building
upon the model presented by Amess and Roberts (2004), Ghemawat and Kennedy
(1999), Rutkowski (2006), let's start with the following model:
(1)
where Yi is the measurement of concentration, Si is the vector of strategic barriers, Ti
is the vector of technological barriers to enter a market, Gi is the vector of variables
representing government policy, Fi is the vector of variables related to international
influences.
Ti as technological barriers to entry include:
(2) 
where PRELAS is price elasticity, CAPUTIL is capacity utilization, MSIZE is market
size. Higher the price elasticity (PRELAS) of demand, lower the market power
(CONCENTR) so that firms have less power of setting the price (above the marginal
costs). CAPUTIL measures the level of utilization of facilities or manpower; it might
have a positive effect on market concentration. Higher the market size (MSIZE),
lower the concentration (CONCENTR) i.e. larger market can support more firms
(Amess and Roberts, 2004).
Si as strategic barriers to entry include:
(3)
where INTASSET stands for intangible nonphysical assets (trademarks, R&D,
patents) and PCMARGIN is a pricecost margin. A firm can invest in R&D so that it
produces innovative goods or services which can be patented or licensed, which in
turn allows to this differentiating incumbent firm to deter the entry for new entrant
firms, as a result market concentration (CONCENTR) is higher. Pricecost margins
(PCMARGIN) can affect market concentration either positively, or negatively. If an
incumbent firm has a high price markup it can prevent new entrants into the market
because it is costly to perform at such a market. One convention is that if pricecost
margins are high, then the concentration will be high. On the other hand, high price
cost margins may attract new entrants leading to decline in market concentration. 
Gi — government can control market concentration through legislation, import
tariffs and quotas, fixing production output and prices:
(4)
where GOVINFLi is government influence on market concentration. Often large
scale stateowned firms tend to be oriented to a domestic market and have lower
export intensity which leads to higher market concentration.
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Fi as international influences include the following:
(5)
where EXPi is export, IMPi is import, FDIi is foreign direct investment in country i.
FDI of multinational enterprises tend to have advanced technology and production
technique, established brand and organizational experience, all give competitive
advantages compared to existing firms. Due to these capabilities MNEs can poten
tially change market concentration. Entered MNE can strengthen its market position
and increase its share; therefore, small firms exit the market or merge.
Based on this model empirical specification is expressed as follows:
(6)
where Yi is market concentration (CONCENTR), PRELAS is price elasticity,
CAPUTIL is capacity utilization, MSIZE is market size, PCMARGIN — pricecost
margin, GOVINFLi is government influence on market concentration, EXPi is
export, IMPi is import, FDIi is foreign direct investment in country i, εi is an error
term capturing countryspecific factors. 
There is a possibility of twoway causality between foreign direct investment and
concentration, and also between FDI and profitability, which can result in endo
geneity. On one hand, a foreign entrant can affect the decision of an incumbent, on
the other hand, competition intensity and pricecost margins can potentially impact
entrant's decision to enter a market. Potential endogeneity in this study which may
arise because of circular causality (as FDI can be attracted where concentration and
profitability is high) will be controlled by employing business environment as an
instrument which is supposed to be correlated with FDI, but must not explain by
itself concentration or profitability. Number of instruments can be used to solve
endogeneity, i.e. macroeconomic stability, competition policy in a given country
(anticompetitive behaviour), public regulation, court system and law, security, taxes,
bureaucratic burden and corruption, infrastructure (telecommunication, electricity,
water etc.) — all can proxy foreign direct investment. The modeling framework
adopted here is similar to that employed by Amess and Roberts (2004), Rutkowski
(2006). Twostep method of moment's instrumental variables method will be
employed to run the regression.
4. Data. This study provides some new contributions, first of which is an attempt
to combine hard measures of foreign direct investment and soft data on the percep
tion of managers. Intensity of competition does not always accurately represent the
market concentration, because of the likelihood of imperfect information or prevail
ing shortterm concerns of managers. As Sutcliffe and Huber (1998) found in the case
of a particular industry managers' perceptions are homogeneous, i.e. general percep
tion is of a uniform industrial conditions, however, it is heterogeneous in the case of
different industries. Therefore, managers' perception would fit the objective measure
ment of market structure. In addition, this way of measuring provides more qualita
tive results since it is different from objective assessment or historical data. Second
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novelty of this research would be an attempt to draw a general view of FDI impact in
transition countries since it contains 26 CEEC and CIS economies as compared to
the previous authors' singlecountry approach. This provides unbiasedness of country
specificities.
The crosscountry analysis is based on the data for 26 countries. All market char
acteristics used in this research except FDI indicator are drawn from the survey data
base compiled by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
World Bank which was conducted in 2001 interviewing 6,500 enterprises in 26 tran
sitional economies: 15 from CEE (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey) and 11 from the CIS
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan).
FDIi is foreign direct investment in country i, i.e. inward foreign direct invest
ment stock in 2000 is used in this study. It is drawn from the World Investment
Directory of UNCTAD for 2000. General measure of the inward FDI stock in rela
tion to the gross domestic product is used in this study. Log form is used to ensure a
normal distribution.
Dependent variable Yi concentration (CONCENTR) is a binary variable
based on the responses to the question how many competitors does firm face in
major product/service line at the domestic market. The answers can be grouped
into 3 groups according to the grades that respondents gave: monopoly (if a firm
does not face any competitor, high concentration, CONCENTR takes value 1),
oligopoly (if a firm faces 14 competitors, high concentration, takes value 1), com
petitive market (if  a firm faces more than 4 competitors, low concentration, value
0).
PRELAS is price elasticity, consumers' reaction to 10% change in the price for a
main product or service. The respondents’ answers can be grouped into 4 groups:
PRELAS takes value 1 if demand remains the same; PRELAS takes value 2 if demand
decreases slightly; PRELAS takes value 3 if demand decreases remarkably; PRELAS
takes value 4 if customers buy from competitors instead.
CAPUTIL is capacity utilization, i.e. level of utilization of facilities or manpow
er. CAPUTIL represents current output compared to the maximum output possible
using the firm's facilities and/or manpower at the time. If firm uses its facilities or
manpower to the full, the answer is 100%; if output was 60% of capacity, the answer
is 60%. 
MSIZE is market size, represents the economy of scale. MSIZE is constructed
as the response to the question how many fulltime employees work in a company.
MSIZE takes value 1 if the number of employed workers in the company is between
2 and 49; MSIZE takes value 2 if the number of employed workers in a company is
between 50 and 249; MSIZE takes value 3 if the number of employed workers in a
company is between 250 and 9999.
PCMARGIN is pricecost margin, representing profitability of a company and
showing the level  of gross profits in relation to the total sales (in %, 2001). PCMAR
GIN takes value 1 if profits are negative; PCMARGIN takes value 2 if a firm makes
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no profits (zero profits); PCMARGIN takes value 3 if profits are between 1 and 10%;
4 — profits are between 11 and 20%; 5 — profits are between 21 and 30%; 6 — prof
its are between 31 and 40%, 7 — profits are more than 40%.
GOVINFLi is government influence on market concentration; it shows
ambiguous impact of state/ government. GOVINFL takes value 1 if the respond
ing firm indicates its legal organization of its company as a state/municipal/dis
trictowned enterprise or corporatized stateowned enterprise; and GOVINFL
takes value 0 if the legal status of a company is one of the following: single propri
etorship, partnership, cooperative, corporation, privately held, corporation listed
on a stock exchange. Ownership type can influence concentration through prof
itability. 
EXPi is a share of nondomestic sales of a firm. Export is included in the model,
because although MSIZE captures the impact of the scale of economies, it does not
include employment in affiliates abroad. Therefore, export (EXP) can complement
the market size (MSIZE).  Variable import (IMP) controls the profitability impact of
international trade and shows importance of competition from imports for the main
product line at a domestic market. IMPi is graded on the 7point scale: from 1 (not
important) to 7 (do not know; 6 — product is not imported, 5 — extremely impor
tant).
To control for endogeneity problem a group of variables which describes business
environment in a country are chosen as following:
ACP is anticompetitive practices, it represents how effective is the work of
authorities that regulate competition. Variable is graded on the 5point scale: from 1
(no obstacles) to 5 (don't know; 4 — major obstacles).
CRT1 is a court system; LBRREG is a burdensomeness of labor regulations.
These two instrumental variables can proxy FDI, i.e. if these two systems work effi
ciently, then there is a higher likelihood that investor puts in its investments. CRT1
represents how often court system is fair and impartial in resolving business disputes.
CRT2 can be also useful in explaining FDI; it shows how often court system is able to
enforce its decisions when resolving business disputes. Both CRT variables are grad
ed by 7 points (1 — never, 7 — do not know; 6 — always). LBRREG represents how
problematic is labor regulations factor for operations and growth of business. The
variable is graded on the 5point scale: from 1 (no obstacles) to 5 (don't know; 4 —
major obstacles).
TELECOM is telecommunications system, in particular, the number of days
when mainline telephone service was unavailable. Variable takes numeric values (days
in a year). 
SCRT is a dummy variable for security, if a firm pays protection payments, then
SCRT takes value 1, otherwise 0. 
POTIME is time that senior management spends dealing with public officials about
laws application or interpretation and access to public services (%). 
TRINTENS is trade intensity, which is an average of export EXP (share of
nondomestic sales, in %) and import IMP (observed importance of competition
from imports for the main product line at a domestic market). The variable repre
sents the level of tradability of certain goods at a market.
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Summing up, these are the instruments which potentially characterize the busi
ness environment: anticompetitive practices ACP, court system CRT1, CRT2, labor
regulations LBRREG, telecommunication system TELECOM, security SCRT, time
that senior management spends dealing with public officials about the law application
or interpretation POTIME, trade intensity TRINTENS. However, we will keep our
attention on the instruments which are best proxies for FDI, so we will be left only
with the instrumental variables which are strongly correlated with FDI (with signifi
cance below 0.01) and with those which are correlated with more than one variable
are left out (to prevent collinearity of the instruments).
5. Empirical Results. Hausman endogeneity test conducted in order to define
whether it is better to estimate the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) or
instrumental variables method (IV) suggests that the consistency of the OLS
should be rejected and 2SLS has to be used instead. However, the postestimation
DurdinWuHausman test which uses augmented regressors and produces a robust
test statistics provides evidence that the foreign direct investment variable is
endogenous. Testing the relevance of the instruments, performed on the basis of
Shea, Anderson, Cragg and Donald's approaches, suggests that the instruments are
relevant. 
Evaluating the correlation degree between the instruments and endogenous
regressor it appears that the anticompetitive practices ACP, fairness of court system
CRT1, labour regulations LBRREG, time that senior management spends dealing
with public officials POTIME are not correlated with FDI and only court system's
decision enforcement CRT2, telecommunication system TELECOM, security
SCRT passes the test of instrument correlation with the regressor. Nevertheless, the
next stage — instrumental variables (2SLS) regression — shows that endogenous
regressor FDI has an IV coefficient which is well distinguished from zero and condi
tioning on other factors FDI appears to play an important role in determining the
market concentration CONCENTR (Table 1).
Table 1. Instrumental Variables (2SLS) regression (author’s own estimations)
First+stage  regressions
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Source SS df  MS  Number  of  obs = 4448 
      F(14, 4433) = 19.31 
Model 19.1461464 14 1.36758189  Prob  >  F  = 0.0000 
Residual 313.90722 4433 .070811464  R-squared = 0.0575 
      Adj  R-squared = 0.0545 
Total 333.053366 4447 .074893943  Root  MSE  = .2661 
 Coef. Std.  Err. t P>|t|  [95%  Conf. Interval] 
  
lnfdi  
prelast .0267659 .0036696 7.29 0.000  .0195717  .0339601 
caputil .0011017 .0002005 5.49 0.000  .0007086  .0014948 
msize .0050166 .0060471 0.83 0.407  -.0068386  .0168719 
pcmargin -.0194079 .0035793 -5.42 0.000  -.026425 -.0123907 
govinfl .0147882 .0124291 1.19 0.234  -.0095791  .0391556 
exp .0220782 .018308 1.21 0.228  -.0138147  .0579711 
imp .0118181 .0026565 4.45 0.000  .0066102  .0170261 
The End of Table 1
Summing up, IV is more appropriate in comparison with OLS according to
Hausman endogeneity test due to the endogeneity problem, however there is a possi
bility of loss in precision. Postestimation DWH test suggests that FDI should be treat
ed as an endogenous variable. Testing the relevance of instruments suggests that the
instruments are adequate to identify the equation. Although evaluating the correla
tion degree between the instruments and endogenous regressor shows that the anti
competitive practices ACP, fairness of court system CRT1, labour regulations LBR
REG, time that senior management spends dealing with public officials POTIME is
not correlated with the foreign direct investments and only court system's decision
enforcement CRT2, telecommunication system TELECOM, security SCRT passes
the test of instrument correlation with regressor. Nevertheless, the next stage —
instrumental variables (2SLS) regression — shows that endogenous regressor FDI has
an IV coefficient which is well distinguished from zero and conditioning on other fac
tors FDI appears to play an important role in determining the host country's market
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Source SS df  MS  Number  of  obs = 4448 
acp -.0056072 .0039169 -1.43 0.152  -.0132863  .0020719 
crt1 .0026004 .0032222 0.81 0.420  -.0037166  .0089175 
crt2 -.0252838 .0030035 -8.42 0.000  -.0311722 -.0193954 
lbrreg -.0081829 .0044792 -1.83 0.068  -.0169644  .0005987 
telecom -.0005305 .0001275 -4.16 0.000  -.0007805 -.0002805 
scrt .0485697 .010949 4.44 0.000  .0271041  .0700353 
potime -.0004888 .00035 -1.40 0.163  -.0011749  .0001972 
trintens (omitted) 
_cons 1.214077 .0296792 40.91 0.000  1.155891  1.272263 
Instrumental  variables  (2SLS)  regression 
 SS df  MS  Number  of  obs = 4448 
Source   
      F( 8, 4439) = 51.28 
Model 67.4242939 8 8.42803674  Prob  >  F  = 0.0000 
Residual 740.143152 4439 .166736461  R-squared = 0.0835 
      Adj  R-squared = 0.0818 
Total 807.567446 4447 .181598256  Root  MSE  = .40833 
 Coef. Std.  Err. t P>|t|  [95%  Conf. Interval] 
  
concentr  
lnfdi -.1249267 .1387812 -0.90 0.368  -.3970071  .1471536 
prelast .0525379 .0067064 7.83 0.000  .0393899  .0656859 
caputil -.0005861 .0003464 -1.69 0.091  -.0012653  .0000931 
msize -.0563546 .0091929 -6.13 0.000  -.0743774 -.0383319 
pcmargin -.0061265 .0062629 -0.98 0.328  -.0184049  .0061518 
govinfl -.1816588 .018955 -9.58 0.000  -.21882 -.1444975 
exp -.1732356 .0281266 -6.16 0.000  -.2283776 -.1180935 
imp -.0150549 .0043898 -3.43 0.001  -.0236612 -.0064487 
_cons 3.070613 .1601368 19.17 0.000  2.756665  3.384561 
 lnfdi 
Instrumented: 
Instruments: prelast  caputil  msize  pcmargin  govinfl  exp  imp  acp  crt1  crt2 
 lbrreg  telecom  scrt  potime  trintens      
concentration. Test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are
valid at the 1% level. There is no problem with heteroscedasticity in the disturbance
term of the model according to Pagan and Hall test.
6. Conclusion. The results of key specification tests show that the pvalue associ
ated with the null hypothesis that the instruments affect concentration through their
effects on foreign direct investment is equal to p = 0.0000 (Sargan (score) chi2(2) =
49.789). The test passes the test at the 1% critical value level which indicates that the
instruments are well identified. Thus, the tests of overidentifying restrictions do pass
and  foreign direct investment can play influential role for market concentration. 
Summarizing the strength of the instruments it was observed that the Fstatistics
from the firststage regressions of FDI indicator on the instruments is significant
(F(14, 4433) = 19.44) which means that the instruments have explanatory power for
foreign direct investments. In summary, the specification tests suggest that the IV esti
mator is producing consistent estimates of β and captures the causal effect from FDI
to market concentration.
The results obtained in this study are consistent with the empirical findings of
Amess and Roberts (2004), Konings (2001) who found large and highly significant
negative effects of FDI on concentration. 1% change of FDI leads to 12.50%
(21.51% in the case of GMM method) decrease in concentration. This result sug
gests that foreign direct investment (multinational enterprises) tend to have
increased competition at a market despite advanced technologies and production
techniques, established brand and organizational experience, which all give com
petitive advantages compare to existing firms. Although spillover and technology
effect was not considered specifically in this study it can be clearly seen that MNEs
encourage existing firms by increasing competition and decreasing concentration.
In addition, 1% change in pricecost margins leads to 6.71% decrease in concen
tration which supports the theory that high pricecost margins may attract new
entrants which can lead to the decline in market concentration. These results are
not at odd with Amess and Roberts (2004), Konings (2001), Siotis (2003) results
who studied FDI impact in developing economies. Amess and Roberts (2004)
studying concentration of Polish manufacturing during early years of transition
concluded that FDI "leads to increased competition for domestic firms because
investing firms own high technology and proprietary assets". Konings (2001) using
firmlevel panel data, investigated the implications of FDI for productivity per
formance of domestic firms in 3 emerging economies of CEEC. To deal with endo
geneity of ownership and spillovers he applies fixedeffect model with instrumental
variables. Konings (2001) yielded a negative competition effect that dominates a
positive technology effect. Also there appears to be no support for the positive
spillover effect to domestic firms. Siotis (2003) applying TSLS and GMM estimat
ed sectoral markups in Spanish economy for the period 19831996 and found a
huge drop in margins in industries which were the most exposed to international
competition. These results seem to suggest that in developing economies FDI has
potential negative implications for industry concentration, competition and prof
itability of a host country's market. 
This research improved in identifying endogeneity between FDI and concentra
tion as opposed to Jordaan (2005) who also found no support for positive externali
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ties from FDI (in Mexico) but who did not control for FDI which appeared to be
endogenous to the model. 
The research could be further developed by assessing the effect of FDI looking
at the set of developed countries, then separating the effect of FDI into greenfield and
acquisition investments. Alternatively causal effect running in the opposite direction
from concentration  to FDI would be interesting to investigate.
FDI as measured by inward FDI stock (of GDP) in the specified model plays
important role for industry outcome. The evidence for a negative causal relationship
of  FDI and concentration has been provided in the research.
Nevertheless, this study is limited in terms of strategic motives and entry modes,
i.e. either market or efficiency seeking character of entering MNEs or
deterring/accomodating modes of entry are not specified in the model.  
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